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Malatesta and the war interventionist debate 
1914–17: from the ‘Red Week’ to the Russian 
revolutions 
Carl Levy 
This chapter will examine Errico Malatesta’s (1853–1932) position on intervention in the 
First World War. The background to the debate is the anti-militarist and anti-dynastic 
uprising which occurred in Italy in June 1914 (La Settimana Rossa) in which Malatesta was a 
key actor. But with the events of July and August 1914, the alliance of socialists, republicans, 
syndicalists and anarchists was rent asunder in Italy as elements of this coalition supported 
intervention on the side of the Entente and the disavowal of Italy’s treaty obligations under 
the Triple Alliance. 
Malatesta’s dispute with Kropotkin provides a focus for the anti-interventionist 
campaigns he fought internationally, in London and in Italy.1 This chapter will conclude by 
examining Malatesta’s discussions of the unintended outcomes of world war and the 
challenges and opportunities that the fracturing of the antebellum world posed for the 
international anarchist movement. 
Globalised syndicalism, insurrection, imperialism and the shadow 
of world war 
Between 1905 and 1914 the combination of a revived (libertarian) syndicalist movement, 
anti-militarism and anti-imperialism raced around the globe (in the North and the South), 
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propelling anarchism to the forefront of the international left. A new era opened when a war-
weakened Russia nearly succumbed to a direct action movement of soviets in 1905, and a 
call-up of Spanish soldiers to fight the Berbers in Morocco’s Rif Mountains sparked 
Barcelona’s ‘Tragic Week’ in 1909. Industrial unrest exploded in the USA, in the UK, in 
Sweden and in Latin America: the Mexican Revolution had a strong anarchist inflection.2 
New forms of Marxism, whether Rosa Luxemburg’s or Lenin’s, theorised the importance of 
the mass strike or direct action, and did not merely rely upon the ballot: the position that had 
caused the expulsion of the anti-parliamentary socialists and anarchists at the London 
Conference of the Second International in 1896, where Malatesta played a prominent role in 
the defeated opposition.3 
This new era was announced as early as 1902, when Malatesta wrote an article from 
London entitled ‘Lo Sciopero Armato’ [The armed strike].4 The incessant drum-beat of 
imperial adventure, rearmament, inflation and mass anti-militarist direct action reached a 
crescendo in Italy with La Settimana Rossa (Red Week) in Italy in June 1914, when 
Malatesta, a key player in the strategically located anarchist stronghold of Ancona, threatened 
the institutional integrity of Italy’s Savoyard monarchy. For a few brief days a powerfully 
effective broad coalition of all the elements of the subversive Italian left challenged the 
established authorities. The background to this general strike-cum-insurrection was the 
Libyan War, which broke out in late 1911. As the Ottoman Empire faltered under pressure 
from the Libyans, the Balkan Wars were ignited, setting off a chain of events which led to the 
July crisis of 1914, world war and the realignment of left-wing politics.5 
From his London exile, Malatesta quickly realised that the Libyan War would 
destabilise the Giolittian system and increase opportunities for the Italian extra-parliamentary 
left. When Malatesta arrived back in Italy 1913 he sought to cement an anti-dynastic alliance 
of radical republicans, rebel socialists within the PSI (led by the young journalist firebrand, 
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Benito Mussolini), syndicalists and anarchists. The powerful mobilising symbolism of anti-
militarism married to general industrial unrest thrust anti-statism on to the left’s agenda. The 
melding of different and sometimes confusing rebel movements into one broad subversive 
coalition was an Italian version of Malatesta’s recent experience with the British ‘syndicalist 
revolt’.6 
After the Red Week protest collapsed with the failure of the mainstream socialist and 
trade unionist leadership to rally to the cause, Malatesta remained underground in Italy until 
the end of the month. On 20 June 1914, he proclaimed his satisfaction with the recent 
uprising: ‘Who can say now that the revolution is impossible and that popular insurrection is 
the stuff of ’48?’7 However, Malatesta stressed that next time revolutionaries would have to 
have a pre-established plan to guide such popular movements. 
From Vienna, Max Nettlau wrote on 22 June 1914 to Thomas Keell of London’s 
Freedom expressing his admiration for his friend, but admitting concern that the old agitator 
might be gravely endangered. Typically Nettlau, the historian, was dismayed that Malatesta’s 
personal papers had been seized, and on reviewing his life he wrote: 
This is the same Malatesta 40 years ago, in 1874, when he went with a band to the Apulian 
mountains, to Castel del Monte, and later travelling to Switzerland to join Bakunin, was 
arrested at the rail junction of Pesaro and the revolt of 1874 has striking similarities with 
that of 1914 … 
In some parts of Italy it was a real revolution where the people for some days held 
their own – remember only what happened in Catalonia in Ferrer’s days (1909) and Russia 
before and after October.8   
Malatesta hid in the home of a ‘good monarchist’ in Ancona until he was smuggled 
clandestinely via San Marino to Milan for Como, crossing the border at Chiasso and onwards 
to Geneva, Paris and London. He was back in his Arthur Street flat in Soho by the very end 
of June.9 
In an interview with Alfred Rosmer, Malatesta explained the truly revolutionary 
proportions of the rising in the Marches. Ancona had briefly been in the hands of the 
insurgents, the old order had been shaken and a completely new one had replaced the old way 
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of doing things. But the anarchists, he explained, did not propose the immediate expropriation 
of wealth; rather they attempted to run the city autonomously, relying on assistance from 
local peasants and merchants to feed the population.10 The London-based anarchist Voice of 
Labour reported a brief interview with Malatesta, in which he angrily denounced the 
socialists and their affiliated trade union organisations for defusing the situation. But he 
promised to return to Italy ‘to keep alive the workers’ movement’.11 In the July edition of 
Freedom Malatesta finally presented his own short account of the revolt. While maintaining 
his strong criticisms of the reformists, he was honest enough to admit the limitations of 
spontaneous protest. ‘If it had not been for the betrayal of the Confederation,’ he concluded, 
‘we could not yet have made the revolution for the lack of necessary preparation and 
understanding and a much greater importance.’12 He added this optimistic parting 
observation: 
In every way these events have proved that the mass of the people hate the present order; 
that the workers are disposed to make use of all opportunities to overthrow the 
Government; and that when the fight is directed against the common enemy – that is to say 
the Government and the bourgeoisie – all are brothers, though the names Socialist, 
Anarchist, Syndicalist, or Republican may seem to divide them.  
Within a month world war would unravel Malatesta’s short-lived fronte unico. 
Malatesta and the war interventionist debate: the view from 
London  
For most of July Malatesta was ill. He wrote to Luigi Fabbri at the beginning of August that 
the life of Emilia Defendi had lain in the balance for several days.13 But the July crisis and 
the gathering war clouds had not passed him by. Malatesta admitted to Rudolf Rocker that the 
attentat at Sarajevo might have serious consequences, but he still discounted the threat of a 
major war.14 The successive months were probably some of Malatesta’s most trying and 
disheartening. Not only did the outbreak of war shatter his remaining illusions about the 
Second International, but the patriotic responses from within the anarchist camp destroyed 
some of his most enduring relationships. While it is true that the rank and file of the national 
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anarchist movements remained faithful to their anti-militarist and internationalist beliefs, 
many of the most celebrated international personalities declared in favour of war. The unity 
of the London exile community was shattered. Many German anarchists returned to fight for 
the Kaiser. The French anarchists rushed to support the Union sacrée.15 From Vienna, 
Nettlau, in a grotesque correspondence with the Freedom group, supported the Habsburgs’ 
duty to defend the Empire from the Slav threat.16 Malatesta’s discussion group was divided 
when Fernando Tarrida del Mármo, Riccardo Mella, Kropotkin and Varlaam Cherkesov 
came out openly and fervently for the Entente. From Paris Charles Malato and Christian 
Corneilsson endorsed their position. At least until late 1915 the Garibaldino instincts of most 
of the London Italian anarchist colony drew them towards the Entente. Silvio Corio gave 
Henry Hyndman’s jingoist Justice a pro-war interview in March and also contributed articles 
to Mussolini’s pro-interventionist Popolo d’Italia.17 The sensitive Belgian anarchist art critic 
Jacques Mesnil at first endorsed the war, after fleeing from the destruction in his homeland. 
Writing to Fabbri in 1915, he simply thought that a German victory would destroy the liberal 
civilisation of England in which anarchists such as Malatesta had been granted asylum.18 
Despite his weakened health and serious illness in his family, Malatesta immediately 
launched a bitter campaign against Kropotkin’s unalloyed Francophilism. Malatesta struggled 
to preserve anarchist internationalism in a Britain already at war, but he simultaneously 
directed his thoughts to Italy which would not enter the war until May 1915.  
Within a month, two leading newspapers of the Italian anarchist movement, Volontà 
(the newspaper Malatesta edited in Ancona in 1913–14) and Il Libertario (La Spezia), were 
showing signs of confusion; uncertain how to respond to a possible Austrian invasion of 
Italy. A 1915 anarchist conference was postponed as the left attempted to hold back the 
interventionist campaign, now being guided by some of the heroes of June 1914.19 In an 
interview in The Voice of Labour in September 1914 Emidio Recchioni (a close associate of 
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Malatesta in London)20 claimed that most of the Italian population was opposed to war, but 
had to admit that ‘even among some individual anarchists there is a sentimental idea that the 
allies are to some extent fighting for civilisation against militarism …’ 
Malatesta began his campaign in the autumn of 1914. By October he was debating 
with Italian interventionists in Soho and lending support to the anti-war Jewish anarchists in 
the East End.21 The destruction of the Freedom group and the bitter quarrel between 
Malatesta and Kropotkin were the most dramatic events of these first months of war.22 The 
cause of the rupture of this anarchist fellowship can be traced to a consistent Francophilism 
on Kropotkin’s part. In 1882 Kropotkin made his position quite clear: ‘Bismarck knows,’ he 
wrote in a newspaper article,  
that on the day on which the alliance of people of the Latin race take place, German 
supremacy will be at an end. He understands that the principle of the almighty State will 
also be done away with whose faithful expression and final vanguard at this moment is 
Germany – the monarchical as well as the republican, and the republican as well as social 
democrat. An almighty State, even if it wore republican colours can satisfy neither France, 
nor Italy, and even less Spain. Therefore, the alliance of the Latin peoples is the nightmare 
which presses on Germany against which Bismarck works.23 
Seventeen years later Kropotkin repeated the same theme. In 1899 he wrote: 
The triumph of Germany was the triumph of militarism in Europe, of militarism and 
political despotism, and at the same time the worship of the State, of authority and State 
socialism, which is in reality nothing but State capitalism triumphant in the ideas of a 
whole generation.24  
By the early twentieth century Kropotkin, it has been noted, exhibited a habitual ‘mitigated 
French patriotism’.25 
Malatesta had recognised these disturbing tendencies in his comrade’s behaviour for a 
long time, but kept quiet before the war for fear of dividing the movement and discrediting 
one of its foremost talents. ‘I confess,’ he wrote in a pained letter to Freedom in December 
1914, ‘that we were in the wrong not giving importance to his Franco-Russian patriotism, and 
not foreseeing where his anti-German prejudices would land him.’26 Just before his death, 
Malatesta wrote a long article on the tenth anniversary of Kropotkin’s passing. He recalled 
his friend’s conversion to war as a real pathological case and one of the saddest ‘and most 
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tragic events of my life (and I dare say one of his) in which after a decidedly painful 
discussion, we separated as adversaries, almost enemies’.27 
Kropotkin openly declared his views in the October 1914 issue of Freedom. In 
November the anarchist-inspired Milanese Università Popolare reported that Malatesta had 
severely criticised Kropotkin’s position. In December the Italian anarchists learned of 
Malatesta’s position from a letter he sent to Mussolini’s Popolo d’Italia refuting rumours that 
he had joined the interventionists, which also appeared in Avanti!, the main newspaper of the 
Italian Socialist Party.28 Two bitter events precipitated the final break in the anarchist ranks. 
At the end of October Rudolf Rocker and the entire German anarchist community 
were arrested. Rocker was placed in detention in the Olympia exhibition hall in west London, 
on the Royal Edward prison ship (later sunk during the landing at Gallipoli) in the Thames 
and finally in Alexandra Palace in north London for the duration of the war.29 Rocker had 
worried about this possibility soon after war was declared. But Malatesta, somewhat out of 
character, relied on the good sense of the British authorities. ‘You’re alright Rudolf,’ he 
reassured Rocker. ‘Nobody will suspect you of spying for the Kaiser. They won’t touch 
you.’30 Proved wrong, Malatesta forever linked Rocker’s incarceration with Kropotkin’s 
interventionist betrayal; shortly after his arrest Rocker wrote a long refutation of Kropotkin’s 
position in the Yiddish Arbeter Fraynd. The second event involved the chief personalities of 
pre-war London anarchism in another bitter and personal debate. In the autumn just before 
Rocker was interned, Cherkesov, Keell, Schapiro, Malatesta and other Freedom group 
members met in London to discuss the war. Kropotkin was too frail to make the trip from 
Brighton, so Cherkesov deputised for him. Rocker recalled that Cherkesov started the debate 
with a furious defence of the war. 
Malatesta couldn’t contain himself. He kept angrily interrupting Tcherkesov, who had been 
his intimate friend for many years. He said this war like any other war was being fought for 
the interests of the ruling class, not of the nations. It would be different if the workers of 
France and Britain had fought for their countries, and had won, to introduce a new social 
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order. But now it was different, and whichever side the workers fought on they were only 
cannon-fodder. Malatesta agreed that a victory for Germany would lead to a general 
reaction in Europe, but he argued that a victory for the Allies would bring a clericalist and 
royalist reaction which would overthrow the Republic. He said that he too wanted a 
German defeat, but for different reasons than Kropotkin and Tcherkesov. A German defeat 
would start a revolution in Germany which would spread to other countries. The rest of the 
comrades expressed similar views. At this meeting Tcherkesov stood alone.31 
Two manifestos and a new realignment (beyond the Red Week of 
1914 and a return to Malatesta’s line of 1896) 
In November 1914 Malatesta published an impassioned article in Freedom, repeating the 
argument he had voiced privately (‘Anarchists have forgotten their Principles’). He foresaw a 
long inconclusive war with ‘an enormous loss of life and wealth, both sides being exhausted’, 
followed ‘by some kind of peace … leaving all questions open, thus preparing for a new war 
more murderous than the present’. In March 1915 he signed the International Anarchist 
Manifesto on the War (Freedom). His name appeared beside 33 others, many London exiles, 
as well as Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman and Bertoni – who would suffer 
imprisonment for their beliefs. 
Europe in a blaze, twelve million men engaged in the most frightful butchery that history 
has ever recorded; millions of women and children in tears; the economic, intellectual and 
moral life of seven great peoples brutally suppressed, and the conflict becoming every day 
more pregnant with new military complications – such is, for seven months the painful, 
agonising, and hateful spectacle presented by the civilised world. [AQ ref] 
After Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies in June 1915, Malatesta published 
a post-mortem of the ill-fated Italian anti-interventionist campaign. He turned his sharpest 
words against the former allies of the June days – the Republicans and left-wing 
interventionists (Mussolini’s socialists, the syndicalists and anarchists). 
They have done their utmost to resuscitate in the masses the old idea of patriotism, which 
was developed in the time when national independence seemed to be the means for 
attaining emancipation from poverty and bondage, and which had decayed in consequence 
of the experience that a national Government is as bad as a foreign one. They raised the cry 
‘War or Revolution’, and when the King, perhaps to save himself from the revolution has 
declared war, they have put themselves in the mass at the service of the King. What, then, 
about the Republic? Many of them still say that they want a war in order to facilitate the 
revolution; but what nonsense! If Italy is victorious, certainly it will be to the exclusive 
advantage of the Monarchy; and, on the other hand, we cannot conceive that the 
Republicans would be capable of the infamy of pushing the people into war with the secret 
hope that they will be beaten and their country invaded and devastated. [AQ ref] 
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Malatesta settled down to a long brutal war. ‘It is astonishing and humiliating,’ he wrote in 
this article, ‘to see how easily the masses can be deceived by the coarsest lies.’ Malatesta had 
always believed that the possible advantages a war might produce for a revolutionary – a 
weakened state and a radicalised population – were offset by the inherent authoritarianism it 
produced in the masses. In an interview in the Catalan anarchist newspaper Tierra e Libertad, 
Malatesta emphasised the ‘inexhaustible obedience and servility of the most humiliated, of 
the flock-like spirit, of a popular soul which revealed a discouraging fatalism and with the 
resignation of peoples led to massacre. No protest! No spark of rebellion!’ [AQ ref] 
In the spring of 1916 Malatesta finally burned his remaining bridges with the pro-war 
anarchists. Throughout 1915 Kropotkin maintained a correspondence with the pro-war 
French anarchists, and in early 1916 Jean Grave came over to Brighton to formulate their 
Manifesto of the Sixteen which unreservedly endorsed the unconditional defeat of the Central 
Powers. The signatories to the Manifesto were ‘slight in numbers if not names’: Malato, 
Cherkesov, Jean Winstch, Cornelisessen, Jean-Louis Pindy and Grave were the most 
illustrious; nine French citizens, two Russians.32 It was circulated in the pro-war socialist, 
syndicalist and bourgeois press in France and Britain. The Manifesto merely confirmed the 
split which existed in the anarchist movement; nevertheless it raised ill-feeling to 
irreconcilably shrill tones. The deep loathing for German civilisation which it expressed had 
always lain close to the surface of the Francophile libertarian left even before the war. 
Cherkesov, for instance, had written to Jean Grave in the autumn of 1914 anticipating the 
harsh tenor of the Manifesto’s words: he told Grave that the war needed to be followed to its 
logical conclusion and that it was necessary that ‘the Germans were beaten, annihilated, 
humiliated … let, this time, the Allies bring devastation and massacre to that nation of spies, 
butchers, and professional murderers’. [AQ ref] 
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In ‘Pro-Government Anarchists’, Malatesta denounced the Manifesto, which 
demanded ‘a fight to a finish and the crushing of Germany’. The signatories, Malatesta 
continued, ‘take their stand against the idea of “premature” peace’. He could understand how 
republicans, socialists and ‘labourists’ were capable of supporting a militarised state, but such 
behaviour ‘is incomprehensible in the case of “the Anarchists”’. Echoing the cry of the 
Clydeside Shop Stewards Movement, he exploded: ‘in the hope of crushing Prussianised 
England and France; they have submitted themselves to Tsarism; they have restored the 
prestige of the tottering throne of Italy’. The Manifesto was nothing less than ‘criminal’ since 
it added to those forces which desired a prolongation of the war. One year before the Russian 
revolutions and the US entry into the war unsettled the stalemate, Malatesta made a ringing if 
pious demand: ‘Peace ought to be imposed by bringing about the Revolution or least 
threatening to do so. To the point in time, the strength or skill was wanting.’[AQ ref] 
The dispute against the pro-war anarchists was carried into Italy. In June 1916 a long 
anonymous pamphlet (La Guerra Europea e gli anarchici [The European war and the 
anarchists]) appeared. Luigi Fabbri wrote the document, Malatesta may have contributed 
suggestions, and it was printed by Turinese anarchists in the suburbs of ‘Italy’s Clydeside’. 
The pamphlet not only denounced the pro-war anarchists, but it also – sotto voce – warned 
anarchists against too close ties with pacifists and anti-war statist socialists, although 
Malatesta’s contacts in London, Paris and Milan tended towards such an accommodation. 
The intransigence in this pamphlet approached Lenin’s earlier appeal ‘to turn the imperialist 
war into a civil war’.  
Our behaviour has nothing in common with the pacifism of the philanthropic bourgeoisie 
and is clearly differentiated from the neutralism of the authoritarian socialists – we are not 
neutralists, but are hostile to either alliances of States and completely independent from the 
two solutions, in as much as we remain on the terrain of revolutionary libertarian action 
against the statist bourgeoisie, either if they prosecute the war or if they reach a peace.33 
For the remainder of the war neither Malatesta’s nor Fabbri’s positions were so impossibly 
sectarian. Contacts with the French anarchist movement revealed attempts to ally with the 
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very bourgeois pacifist intellectuals denounced in the Turinese pamphlet. For example, the 
Groupe des Temps Nouveaux adopted a moderate position until 1916, appealing for a rapid 
peace based on no territorial annexations or financial reparations for either bloc. Similarly, 
Pierre Martin’s Amis du Libertaire appealed to all anti-war forces and after the autumn 1915 
Zimmerwald Congress, the Groupe des Temps Nouveaux created a ‘ Comité pur la Reprise 
des Relations Internationales’, republishing Malatesta’s ‘Pro-Government Anarchists’ as a 
pamphlet.  
This ecumenical approach by the French was represented by Sebastian Faure’s Ce 
qu’il faut dire (1916) and L’Avenir Internationale, both of which would be more accurately 
described as anti-war journals rather than as strictly anarchist.34 Malatesta may have had 
doubts but he remained in frequent contact with these groups. He had assisted in the Freedom 
group’s recently established International Anarchist Committee of Action which gradually 
established a communications network with the Swiss, German and Italian anarchist 
communities in Zurich, Faure’s circle in Paris and the Italian Comitato di Azione Anarchica 
in Rome. From London and Switzerland the Italian exiles smuggled leaflets into Italy and 
formed an ‘underground railway’ to help deserters escape from the Italian army.35 Although 
warned by the British authorities to stay out of anti-war activities, Malatesta and other Italian 
anarchists helped Italians to avoid being registered for service in the Italian army.36  
Meanwhile the syndicalists were also seeking to re-establish international contacts. 
Armando Borghi had circulated the anti-war syndicalists in the summer of 1915 and 
throughout 1916 he rallied the minorité in the French metalworkers union and the Vie 
Ouvière group to oppose the pro-Allied conventions of trade unionists scheduled to convene 
in Leeds in November 1916. By 1916, and stretching into 1917, complex negotiations were 
underway between the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the libertarian left (since the PSI never 
formally endorsed Italian entry into the war), with the Italian anarchist exiles playing an 
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important role. From 1916 the Italian authorities believed that the ‘rigid’ faction within the 
PSI would soon create an insurrectional alliance with the anarchists and the USI (Unione 
Sindacale Italiana). The rising in Turin during late August 1917 and the well-known meeting 
of the ‘rigids’ in Florence (including a much overshadowed young Antonio Gramsci) that 
autumn reinforced the fears of the Italian government.37 Malatesta also met Italian socialists 
in London from the centre and left of the party.38 But as I have shown elsewhere, even in 
favourable territory such as Turin, the young Gramsci and his comrades in 1917–18 
established obstacles to complete fusion.39 For their part, the anarchist leadership never 
agreed to a formal amalgamation with the socialists, which would inevitably have meant the 
domination of the new organisation by the numerically superior partner. Writing to Mesnil in 
1918, Fabbri explained to the Belgian anarchist, now a member of the French socialist party 
that, in Italy ‘we maintain a sympathetic and courteous and also cooperative attitude with the 
socialists in all those things that we have in common with their ideas and ours, but without 
attempting to join them or they joining us’.40  
In this context, from 1916 to 1917 Malatesta’s spirit revived as the stalemate of war 
brought a new realignment of the anti-war radical and pacifist socialists, anarchists and 
syndicalists, re-energised through the rise of the shop stewards, factory council and soviet 
movements from Glasgow to Turin and from Berlin to St Petersburg. Malatesta knew many 
of the militants in the new movements from the pre-war syndicalist revolt; indeed some had 
been active in the Malatesta Committee, which had prevented his deportation to Italy in 
1912.41 Recchioni’s article published in September 1915 in Freedom was prescient. 
Recchioni predicted a new fronte unico along new lines of political demarcation which the 
war had begun to create – one which would eradicate the division between certain anti-war 
followers of the socialism of the Second International and the pariahs of the Second 
International, the anarchists and syndicalists. 
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On one side will be those who advocate the continuation of the ‘sacred union’ with the 
Liberal and Democratic parties and with the State. There will be a Radical party of reform 
in Germany and so in France and Italy especially, where the new party will join the 
Republicans, Reformist Socialists and some Syndicalists. On the other hand, there will be 
those who will continue to fight capitalism on the old basis of the lutte de classe, or ‘class 
consciousness’, but their Parliamentary and legal action has proved a failure now more 
than ever, they (together with the trade organisations, will in all countries turn to 
revolutionary Syndicalism, if we act quickly), if they are really bona fide, change towards, 
direct action their line in their struggle, that is, towards the Anarchist method, the very 
method they have for many years opposed.42 
But the prehistory of the Third International must also note the mutual suspicion of 
socialists and libertarians towards an amalgamation of forces. Thus the Zimmerwald (1915) 
and Kienthal (1916) Congresses received a mixed response from the Italian anarchist 
leadership. The Italian anarchists organised a nationwide clandestine congress in Ravenna 
during August 1916 to discuss, among other things, the movement’s attitude towards a new 
socialist international. One key anarchist, Pasquale Binazzi of La Spezia, predicted a new era 
of cordial relations between anarchists and socialists. He envisaged an international 
organisation open to all working-class internationalists which would replace the discredited, 
exclusively parliamentary Second International.  
Binazzi’s conception of the new international (a return to Recchioni circa 1915) 
circulated throughout the Italian left in 1916–17. In Turin a leading working-class ‘rigid’ 
socialist, Pietro Rabbezzani, argued on May Day 1916 that he looked forward to a New 
Union of the Labourers of the World, based on anti-parliamentary syndicalist principles as 
the successor to the discredited Second International. And in December 1917, Spartaco 
Lavagnini, a ‘rigid’ socialist railwayman from Florence, defended a similar conception of the 
International, linking it with Malatesta’s anti-parliamentarian position at the London 
Congress of 1896, and as we shall see, Malatesta’s intervention at the USI’s Guerra di Classe 
the previous month, albeit the Florentine’s line was disowned by more sectarian maximalist 
socialists such as Serrati, Bordiga and Gramsci.43 
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From London 1896 redux to the challenge of the soviets (1916–
17): the balance of power and world revolution 
Before the Russian Revolution broke out Malatesta persisted in believing that Germany was 
the weak link among the warring states. On New Year’s Day 1916, he visited Rocker at the 
Alexandra Palace internment camp, and expressed the opinion that the Germans would not be 
able to withstand the British naval blockade much longer. German defeat would mean the 
collapse of the Kaiserreich and social revolution would spread rapidly to other war-weary 
countries. Europe was bleeding to death; it was not a question of victors or vanquished. But 
he added, ‘if America came into the war things would turn out differently. Then Germany’s 
defeat would be overwhelming. She would be crushed.’ France would experience a clerical-
nationalist revival lasting five or ten years and European revolution would be postponed for a 
long time to come.44 In April 1917 on another visit to Rocker, Malatesta had changed 
markedly. The Russian Revolution had broken out and it surprised and invigorated the old 
veteran. ‘The Russian Revolution had given the old rebel new courage and hope,’ Rocker 
recalled.  
He was straining at the leash to go to Russia to serve the Revolution. The British 
Government had refused permission for him to leave the country. But he hoped to get out 
some other way. There was an International Socialist Congress being organised in 
Stockholm. He expected that he would be sent there as delegate, and then he would try to 
make his way to Russia from Sweden. [AQ ref] 
Malatesta was now more optimistic about European revolution. But he realised that it 
depended on the delicate balance between American power and the ability of the Russians to 
weaken the Germans sufficiently to cause unrest in central Europe.45 Malatesta was not 
ignorant of the logic of the balance of power. Rocker explained: ‘It all depended, he said, on 
Russia. If the Russians could hold the Germans back long enough there would be a revolution 
in Germany and Austria. If that didn’t happen then the arrival of the American armies in 
France would end the war before the next Spring.’46 
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Malatesta was wrong. Russia under the Bolsheviks left the war in early spring 1918 
and Germany mounted a menacing drive on Paris that was broken by the British and the 
French: the Americans were only fully mobilised in the spring of 1918 and between then and 
the Armistice of November 1918 they helped break German resistance.47 In any case, in June 
1917 the USI selected Malatesta as their delegate for the never to be convened Stockholm 
peace conference. All the Allied powers refused to grant passports. Malatesta’s movements 
were closely monitored by the British and his correspondence with Borghi was opened. The 
Italian authorities noted that Malatesta was on very good terms with the Russian socialist 
exile community in London, especially the Bolsheviks, with personal ties to Georgii 
Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov.48 But even now this was an alliance of convenience: as noted 
already, Malatesta’s thoughts about a new International, based on his principles of 1896, did 
not go down well with the socialist leadership in Italy. Malatesta’s La Mondiale, he explained 
to the readers of Guerra di Classe in November 1917, would include all the socialists, 
anarchists and syndicalists who had remained faithful to internationalist principles, all those 
who had stuck to the principle of class struggle and had not become instruments of their 
bourgeois governments. La Mondiale, however, was not merely to be syndicalist-oriented as 
some of the left interpreted it, and Malatesta was quick to distance himself from any 
suggestion that he favoured another attempt to revive pre-war efforts at founding a syndicalist 
International, since the corporatism of trade unionism had been open to the seduction of 
collaboration with wartime governments. La Mondiale was neither parliamentarian nor 
syndicalist in conception. It would, Malatesta believed, inspire and coordinate the nationally 
based rebellions of war-weary workers without forcing a variety of movements to conform to 
a guiding political ideology.49 But from the autumn of 1917 a new realignment of forces 
gathered pace, which used the energy of the anti-war mavericks (the anarchists, syndicalists, 
the maximalist libertarian-tinged socialists, and the first ‘apolitical’ vaguely libertarian 
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supporters of the soviets) and reinstated the Marxist dictum of the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’. From 1918, the challenge of Bolshevism caused Malatesta to revisit his youthful 
support of Bakunin in his battle with Marx during the First International, and thus the rebirth 
of a ‘Red Week’ alliance nationally or internationally between 1917 and 1921 was quickly 
overshadowed by the monopolist imperatives of the Bolshevik Third International.50   
Conclusion: Malatesta, Kropotkin and the challenges of world 
war: the fate of antebellum anarchism 
This chapter has illustrated the apparent gulf between the positions of Kropotkin and 
Malatesta, but it is my contention that both men shared many unspoken assumptions. I will 
tease out the implications in this conclusion. 
What did they share in common? Even after their rupture they shared similar 
sociological first premises. If, as we shall see, differing takes on realism and the international 
scene in 1914 divided Malatesta and Kropotkin, the realities of Bolshevik authoritarianism 
after 1917 alienated them both from the outcomes of the October Revolution, which had 
destroyed the non-sectarian ‘sovietist’ kernel of earlier revolutionary events in 1917 itself. 
Malatesta shared Lenin’s use of John Hobson’s interpretation of modern imperialism and like 
Lenin used the mobilising counter-dynamics of imperialism and militarism to craft 
insurrectionary alliances (for Malatesta during the Red Week and then with a projected newly 
reshuffled alliance during the First World War; for Lenin, within Russia, with the Left 
Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists in the lead-up to the October Revolution and then in 
the Bolsheviks’ attempts to ‘asset-strip’ syndicalist, anarchist, shop stewards and council 
communist networks during the formative years of the Third International).51 But whereas 
Lenin used Hobson’s work to update the Marxist Hegelian grand march of the stages of 
history – famously, imperialism was merely the last and highest stage and thus world war set 
the ground for world revolution – Malatesta and Kropotkin denied that there was a last stage.  
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Nor did they believe that there was an Engelsian ‘last instance’, in which Marxist 
determinism stepped in to put paid to anarchist heresy and return good revolutionaries to 
orthodoxy.52 Thus in a speech on the Italian invasion of Libya, given to Italian workers at 
Soho’s Communist Club in 1912, Malatesta asked his audience if they believed that 
‘England’ was rich due to her possession of India. No, he replied, Britain was rich due to the 
comparative advantage of being the first industrial nation, her near monopoly on modern 
technology for nearly fifty years, and also because of her huge deposits of coal. The Italians 
did not need Libya, they too (and here Malatesta the electrician was speaking) had the 
potential of the ‘white coal’ of fast-flowing mountain rivers.53 Thus, for Malatesta and also 
Kropotkin, modern imperialism was the contingent product of militarist and financial 
interests. In a similar vein, Malatesta and Francesco Saverio Merlino54 had argued elsewhere 
that the Risorgimento had failed due to congeries of crony capitalists, the military, landlords, 
bureaucrats and former revolutionaries using the Savoyard state ‘for the enrichment of the 
few to the detriment of the many’.55 
There were other connections to British and European liberalism and republicanism in 
the thought of Kropotkin and Malatesta. Thus Kropotkin’s love affair with the volunteerism 
and self-help of Victorian and post-Victorian society (most famously embodied in the Life 
Boat Society), melded to his older and firm attachment to the French Revolution and its 
reassertion in the Paris Commune of 1871. Besides the previously mentioned linkages to 
British liberals, noted in the case of Malatesta, the Italian revolutionary also sought out 
alliances with radical liberals in Italy in the late 1890s when military dictatorship threatened, 
even though he refused to be a protest candidate in parliamentary elections.56 But in 1914, 
while Kropotkin argued the logic of the lesser evil and found comfort in the traditions of 
British liberalism and French republicanism, Malatesta disagreed. 
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Ruth Kinna has argued that Kropotkin saw the imperialism of the German Empire as 
the greatest threat to a future libertarian world, because a victorious Kaiserreich would also 
undermine the bourgeois liberties of the present statist UK or France. She also contends that 
Kropotkin espied the incipient federalisation of the Russian Empire in the wake of 1905 
while in turn the military weakness of the Tsarist Empire made it a lesser threat than 
potentially triumphant Central Powers.57 Malatesta begged to differ: the Allies posed the 
threat of a French chauvinist/Anglo-Knouto alternative, and in any case the war would lead to 
the permanent militarisation of the world, and merely be the first of many world wars of 
vengeance. Kropotkin and other Allied war interventionist anarchists thought the invasions of 
Belgium and Serbia by the Central Powers demanded action and made choosing sides easy. 
But, Malatesta argued, was the treatment of the Persians, Indians, Tonkinese (Vietnamese), 
Congelese and Moroccans by the ‘liberal’ Allies any better?  
One has to understand the concept of the lesser evil by marrying it to geopolitics.58 
This is first approached by examining how Malatesta and Kropotkin reacted to the failure of 
the European workers to stop the war in July/August 1914. For Kropotkin, the German 
masses had been brainwashed long before 1914 by the explicit social imperialism and 
authoritarianism of German Marxism, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been the 
most efficient agents of German imperialism because they had made German domination an 
unspoken shared common sense of the entire German nation. Thus during the war, 
suggestions of peace in 1916 were anathema to Kropotkin because the Germans would not 
agree to give up their territorial gains. In certain respects, Kropotkin’s line anticipated 
Woodrow Wilson’s pronouncements in 1917, by arguing essentially that there would be no 
peace without regime change in Berlin. Indeed, one could argue that Kropotkin expressed this 
even more intransigently, because he seemed to be arguing that the entire ‘Teutonic race’ had 
to undergo political and cultural re-education. However, for Kropotkin, the Latin races were 
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inherently libertarian, or at least had been saved from authoritarian temptations by their 
retention of the traditions of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune. Thus the 
victories of the Bakuninists in the Latin world in the 1870s had prevented the definitive 
victory of the Marxist authoritarian alternative in the First International.  
For Malatesta, ‘Latin Unions’ were pernicious nonsense. Although he worked with 
the ‘Colonel of the Commune’, Amilcare Cipriani, in the 1880s and 1890s, he denounced his 
proposed Union of the Latin Peoples of 1888 (a device announced by Cipriani to prevent 
Prime Minister Crispi, scheming with Bismarck, from launching a nation-building war 
against France). It was no surprise to Malatesta that from his Parisian exile, the aged Cipriani 
endorsed Kropotkin’s position in 1914.59 As we have seen, Malatesta also returned to his 
First Internationalist roots, the Mondiale, but in this case the unit would be universal, 
cosmopolitan and non-sectarian, not solely Bolshevik, and certainly not merely ‘Latin’ or 
‘Latin-Slavic’. 
For Malatesta, the choice of the lesser evil undermined anarchist solidarity. In this 
volume, Peter Ryley mounts a spirited defence of the logic of the lesser evil, while Davide 
Turcato, in contradistinction, argues that Malatesta’s position preserved the coherence of 
ends and means that morally and practically was the best policy. I suggest that Ryley and 
Turcato have missed the point. Malatesta’s position was always more pragmatic then this 
either/or dilemma suggests. In order to be the complete anarchist, Malatesta would have had 
to have taken a Tolstoyan position on the First World War. But Malatesta’s position was a 
libertarian version of the Leninist slogan of turning the world war into a civil war: thus the 
Mondiale was a union of all anti-parliamentary strands who followed the line of class 
struggle (it is unclear if the humanist Malatesta would be easy with that). There were not 21 
Points but perhaps one or two points, and how these would be enforced was never tested. 
Nevertheless, Malatesta was a pragmatic revolutionary, who had endorsed anarchist socialism 
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during the unrest of the 1880s and 1890s to seek socialist allies and broader alliances in the 
run-up to the Red Week of 1914 and later during the Biennio Rosso (1919–20). In effect the 
anarchists were just one component in a larger non-anarchist revolutionary coalition. 
Anarchism, he argued would only be fulfilled in the longer term: men and women had to be 
free to practise libertarian lives in the workplace, in their families and in their communities, 
and that would only occur through generations of education; but this could only occur after 
the revolution. Thus, in effect, the anarchists would be the loyal, critical opposition in post-
revolutionary society, where their victorious partners’ authoritarian impulses would be kept 
in check through newly libertarian societal structures and the vigilance of the anarchists.60 In 
this regard, Kropotkin’s argument that one had to choose the Allies to prevent the destruction 
of liberal and republican Europe, because this Europe, rather than an enlarged Kaiserreich, 
allowed for the possibility of future anarchist advances, is not so different from the 
consequences of Malatesta’s decades’ old practice and theorisation of choosing a lesser evil.  
But one can pursue this argument one step further. Malatesta argued that it was 
legitimate for a people to defend their country from aggressive invasion. He tried to fight 
with the Serbian Bosnian insurgents against the Tur in Bosnia in 1876, and with the forces of 
the Egyptian nationalist Urabi Pasha against the British outside Alexandria in 1882, although 
he opposed Cipriani’s expedition to Greece in 1897, because he felt the Italian volunteers 
were catspaws of the King of Greece.61 Thus a revolutionary defence of one’s homeland was 
justified, and naturally the Paris Commune (with all its faults) remained the model to which 
one returned. This gave Mussolini an easy target when in the autumn of 1914 Malatesta’s 
position was still unclear, so that Mussolini could argue that Malatesta’s previous actions 
would lead one to believe that he was on the side of intervention.62 Indeed in 1917 in another 
context, it was reported by Italian agents that Malatesta had told a group of Italian workers in 
London that in light of the apparent ongoing disintegration of the Italian army following the 
  
 
105 
rout at Caporreto and the recent Bolshevik revolution, anarchist and other Italian 
revolutionaries should reform the Royal Army and start the revolution in Italy itself.63 In the 
unlikely event that this might have happened, would Malatesta have then endorsed a 
defensive revolutionary war against the Austrians and Germans? Counterfactuals aside, it is 
certainly the case that during the Russian Civil War and the Allied intervention, even as he 
opposed Leninism, he still supported the Bolshevik-led side and was a notable participant in 
the ‘Hands Off Russia’ campaign in London in 1918 and 1919.64 In the end Malatesta made 
his choice of the lesser evil, it was just that his priorities were different to Kropotkin’s. 
Malatesta was truly radical during the First World War when on occasion he 
transcended the false dichotomy over lesser evils, as he ruminated on the deeper message of 
industrialised mass killing. Malatesta was a not a Tolstoyan or Gandhian, and he advocated 
violent revolution, albeit plumping for the least violence necessary.65 That is why, he would 
argue, an anarchist revolution would have prevented the unspeakable violence of the war. But 
the First World War give birth to the unspeakable violence of the Russian Civil War, where 
Malatesta took a partisan if hedged stand.66 Later, however, in light of the decline of the 
anarchist movement in the 1920s and the consolidation of Leninist communism and 
Mussolini’s fascism, Malatesta took a deeper look at the dialectics of violence in modern 
society.67 He had hinted at the problems of mass society as early as the turn of the century 
when the new era of social imperialism was signalled by the Dreyfus Affair, the suppression 
of the Boxer Rebellion in China, the Spanish-American War and the Boer War.68 And he 
witnessed in person the chauvinism and jingoism of the crowds in New York and London. 
But perhaps even more chilling was the apathy that the popular press and drink induced in 
London’s impoverished working class, which ‘brutalises itself in its “public houses”, 
indifferent to everything else’.69  
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Ruminations on the role of mass society and the road to totalitarianism would have to 
await the next generation of Italian anarchists, particularly the interventions of Camillo 
Berneri on interwar anti-Semitism and the logic of Stalinism and Nazism.70 Kropotkin’s 
federalisation or the libertarian take on Mazzinian ethics that Malatesta endorsed were of 
little use, although the attempts by Rocker to flesh out an anarchist theory of nationalism as 
the genocidal killing was happening still retain their interest.71 Inflamed new national 
passions and heightened class tensions focused on minorities and ‘class enemies’ in newly 
created hyper-nationalist states or former truncated, truculent revolutionised empires, and the 
endless and bloody wars of vengeance that Malatesta had foretold in 1915 and 1916 came to 
pass at mid-century. 
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